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IN THE SUPREHE COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FLOID C. HARTI1AN and 
RUTH A. HART11AN, 
vs. 
Plaintiffs-
Appellants, 
ORA ANN POTTER, HUSKY OIL 
COMPANY and CHEVRON OIL 
COMPANY, 
Defendants-
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS HUSKY OIL COMPANY AND 
CHEVRON U.S.A. INC. (FORMERLY CHEVRON OIL 
COHPANY) 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by the Plaintiffs-Appellants, gran-
tees, of a 1951 conveyance, to quiet title to 25% of the oil, 
gas and mineral rights of certain real property and for an account-
ing of and judgment against the Defendants-Respondents for oil and 
gas royalty payments allocable to that 25% interest. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The natter came before the Honorable David K. Winder, 
Judge of the Third Judicial District Cou~t of Salt Lake County 
on the separate Motions for Summary Judgment filed by the Plain-
tiffs-Appellants Floid c. and Ruth A. Hartman, (hereinafter refer-
red to as "Hartmans") and the Defendant-Respondent Ora Ann Potter, 
hereinafter referred to ,as "Potter". The lower court denied 
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Appellants-Hartmans' motion and granted the motion of Respondent 
Potter. The Court quieted in Respondent Potter title to the dis-
puted 25% interest in oil, gas and mineral rights and rejected 
the claim of the Hartmans to any title or interest therein. Also, 
the Court ordered that the oil and gas royalties being held by the' 
Defendant Husky Oil Company, (hereinafter referred to as "Husky"), 
be paid to Respondent Potter 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants-Respondents Husky and Chevron U.S.A., Inc. 
seek affirmance of the decision of the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
While li.espondents Husky and Chevron U.S .A., Inc. do not 
disagree with the "factual" statements of Appellants in their 
Statement of Facts, Respondents do object to the argument and 
conclusions inserted therein. Also, we believe that Appellants' 
statement is both insufficient and incomplete and does not make 
proper reference to the record on Appeal for this Court's benefit. 
Therefore, these Respondents recite the following Statement of 
Facts and refer to the record in the lower court by the marked 
page number ("R.-"): 
In 1951, William M. Potter and Rose K. Potter, husband 
and wife, and William Potter, Jr., their son, were the owners of 
the center 160 acres of real property in Section 32, Township 1 
South, Range 4 West, U.S.M. in Duschesne County, together with 
50% of the oil, gas and mineral rights pertaining to the 160 
acres. The Potters had previously owned 100% of the oil, gas 
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mineral rights but had conveyed 50% to a Mr. C. R. Bennett of 
Tulsa, Oklahoma on July 29th, 1946. (R. 173). 
On June 27th, 1951, Hr. and Hrs. Potter entered into 
a contract to sell the 160 acres to the Plaintiffs-Appellants. 
(R. 51). The parties met at the First Security Bank in Roose-
velt, Utah where a bank official, Mrs. J. 0. Orser, prepared a 
contract of sale, escrow documents and a warranty deed. (R. 212-
217). The bank conducted the business for Plaintiffs and the 
Potters and both parties were present and agreed what should be 
in the contract. However, Plaintiff Floid Hartman has no present 
recollection of the terms of the contract or the escrow agreement 
other than that he was to make yearly payments of principal and 
interest to the Potters through the bank and that the deed given 
was generally consistent with the contract. All copies of the 
contract for sale and other closing documents were either lost or 
destroyed. (R. 129, 214-217). At the time of the conveyance, 
the Potters were approximately 70 years old. (R. 216). 
Also, a warranty deed from the Potters to Hartmans was 
prepared by the bank, signed by Potters and placed into escrow 
until the purchase price was paid by Hartman. (R. 83, 217). 
Sometime before December 31st, 1954 the purchase price was paid 
and Mr. Hartman received the escrowed deed. The deed was dated 
June 27th, 1951 and recorded April 30th, 1955. (R. 83). The 
deed provided as follows: 
The SW l/4 of the NE 1/4; the NW 1/4 of the SE 
1/4; the SE 1/4 of the NW l/4 and the NE 1/4 of 
the sw l/4; of Section 32, Township 1 South, Range 
4 West, U.S.M. containing 160 acres more or less; 
together with all improvements and appurtenances 
to said land belonging. 
-3-
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There is reserved unto the Grantors three-fourths 
(3/4) of all the oil, gas and mineral rights to 
the above land belonging. With the right of in-
gress and egress thereon for the purpose of find-
ing and producing oil, gas and minerals thereon. 
This deed is given subject to a prior lease of 
all the oil, gas and mineral rights to said land 
belonging. (R. 83). 
Floid Hartman testified that at the time of the sale 
in 1951, he was fully aware if the previous conveyance by Potter 
to C. R. Bennett. The Bennett transaction appeared of record with 
the Duschesne County Recorder. Also, a title opinion given to 
Hartmans by the Duschesne County Abstract Company disclosed that 
Potters only owned a part of the oil and gas rights. (R. 227). 
Sometime after 1951, Mr. and Mrs. Potter died and William 
Potter, Jr., succeeded to their ownership of the oil, gas and min-
eral rights. In 1970, the younger William Potter leased the re-
served oil and gas rights to Altex Oil Company. Subsequently, 
William Potter, Jr. also died and the reserved oil, gas and min-
eral interest passed to the Respondent Ora Ann Potter. (R. 51). 
Also, in 1967, Appellants entered into an oil and gas lease with 
Respondent Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (hereinafter referred to as 
"Chevron") . (R. 5). 
In April 1973, an oil well was completed near the property 
and production was commenced by Altex Oil Company and Chevron pur-
suant to a working agreement and division order. In October 1973, 
Husky succeeded to and presently retains the leasehold interests 
of both Altex and Chevron Oil Companies. (R. 37-41). 
While Chevron made lease rental payments to Appellants, 
prior to 1973, Altex and its successors also paid Respondent 
Potter annual lease rental payments. Since production from the 
-4-
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well commenced in April 1973, Respondent Husky has paid oil and 
gas royalties to Respondent Potter on the basis of her ownership 
of one-half (1/2) of the oil, gas and mineral rights. (The other 
one/half (1/2) owned by successors of C.R. Bennett). No royalty 
payments have ever been made to Appellants. (R. 40-46, 76). 
On May 13th, 1976 Appellants filed this action to quiet 
their claimed l/4th interest in the oil, gas and mineral rights 
which Appellants allege was granted to them by the 1951 deed. Ap-
pellants also demanded judgment against all the Defendants for the 
amounts paid to Defendant Potter allocable to the disputed l/4 
interest. (R. 2). All the Respondents answered, denied Appel-
lants claim to any oil, gas and mineral rights, and asserted that 
the 1951 deed reserved in the grantors the 50% interest in the oil, 
gas, and mineral rights owned by the grantors at the time of the 
conveyance. (R. 105,109, 155-159). 
Following the deposition of Appellant Floid Hartman 
(R. 204) and numerous interrogatories, Appellants and Respondents 
Potter filed separate Motions for Summary Judgment. (R. 160, 
171). In a Memorandum Decision dated June 26th, 1978 the trial 
court granted Summary Judgment to Respondent Potter which judg-
ment was entered on July lOth, 1978. (R. 185-186, 193-196). The 
lower court determined that the 1951 deed effectively reserved 
in the Grantors their 50% oil, gas and mineral rights owned at 
the time of the conveyance and conveyed no interest in the oil 
and gas rights to Appellants Hartman. (R. 193-195). 
-5-
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POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING 
SUM!1ARY JUDGHENT TO RESPONDENT:.; AND IN 
DENYING APPELLANTS' MOTION 
This is merely a case of determining the language of 
a deed wherein the grantors reserved to themselves 75% of all 
the oil, gas and mineral rights when they only owned 50% of 
the same. Appellants claim their interpretation of the language 
requires that title to 1/4 of the oil, gas and mineral rights be 
quieted in Appellants because of what they assert they believed 
at the time. In the lower court, Appellants relied upon the 
theory that the court should seek out the intention of the par-
ties to the c0nveyance. Appellants do not claim any fraud or 
mutual mistake in the deed as given nor do they seek reformation 
of the instrument. Appellants do not claim or argue that the 
grantors breached any warranty of title. Appellants merely 
desire the court to construe a deed so as to satisfy Appellants' 
interests. 
Respondents submit that in construing the language of 
the deed that the court must consider and give effect to the 
entire document. When the entire language of the document is 
considered the only reasonable interpretation of the deed is 
that the grantors conveyed the surface rights to Appellants but 
retained all of the mineral rights which they owned. 
In essence, Appellants'claim is that 1) the deed is 
obviously ambiguous and, therefore, the court should apply 
Appellants' arbitrary rules of construction to construe the 
deed against the grantor and in accordance with the claimed 
-6-
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"interpretation of the parties"; and 2) the court should 
determine and give effect to the "true intent" of the parties 
by only considering Appellants' self-serving statements and 
actions. The lower court properly rejected both assertions. 
As to Appellants argument that a deed is always con-
strued against the grantor, this Court has previously stated 
that this rule is one of last resort only and should not be 
applied when the court can satisfactorily and reasonably give 
effect to the intent of the parties. Russell v. Geyser -Marion 
Gold Mining Company, 18 U.2d 363, 423 P.2d 487, 490 (1967). In 
Russell, the court refused to arbitrarily interprete a deed 
against the grantor when a different result was intended in the 
document. In Howard v. Howard, 12 U.2d 407, 367 P.2d 193, 195 
(1962) this Court also stated that a grantor's intention should 
be given effect if reasonably determinable. The meaning of a 
reservation in a deed should be arrived at by determining the 
intent of the grantors at the time of the conveyance. Jolly v. 
Wilson, 478 P.2d 886 (Okla., 1970), Whittle v. Wolff, 249 Or. 
217, 437 P.2d 114 (1968). Appellants also assert that their 
own statements of what they believed and what they claim was 
discussed with the grantors, now deceased, evidence the "inten-
tion of the parties." Such testimony is inadmissible under 
Section 78-24-2, U.C.A. 1953, as amended. Even were it admis-
sible, it is most self-serving and asserts no facts but only 
makes claims of what Appellants "believed", all unsupported by 
the record. 
Appellants are not able to show that the intentions of 
-7-
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the grantors, or even of both the parties, were that the Appel-
lants were to receive any oil, gas and mineral rights. Appel-
lants do not in any way support their naked assertions of what 
both parties intended by any reference to the record before the 
court. The record provides no admissible evidence that the deed 
was ever intended to convey to Appellants any mineral rights. 
Appellants only claim they "believed that [they] were re-
ceiving 1/4 of the mineral rights" (R. 179, 5) This is nothing 
more than the most blatant of self-serving statements and is en-
tirely inconsistant with Appellant Hartman's admission that he had 
both actual and constructive knowledge of the mineral rights owned 
by Potters and that Potters had made a previous conveyance. (R. 
227) . Appellants certainly cannot be heard to say that the lower 
court should have awarded them Judgment based on the record before 
it. Rather, the record before this court confirms that the court 
properly awarded Summary Judgment to the Respondents based on the 
document itself and the situation of the parties at the time of 
the conveyance. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT 
RESPONDENT POTTER OWNS SOPERCENT OF 
THE GAS, OIL AND MINERAL RIGHTS 
Appellants contend that there is "little question" 
that the deed (R. 83) from Potters to Appellants is "ambiguous". 
For some strange reason Appellants also seem to absurdly suggest 
that the deed would even be ambiguous had Potters owned all 100% 
of the oil, gas and mineral rights at the time of the conveyance. 
Since the deed is ambiguous, Appellants say, the court must look 
-8-
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to extrinsic evidence (e.g. Appellants self-serving statements 
of believe) to determine the intent of the parties. 
While Respondents agree that the intent of the parties 
is important to construe an ambiguous document it does not nee-
essarily follow that a court must look beyond the document to 
extrinsic evidence to determine the intention of the language. 
The court has a duty to ascertain the intent from the language 
of the document itself and not from what a party secretly be-
lieved or intended. In construing a deed it is necessary to 
give effect and meaning to each word and clause of the document. 
Fowler v. Tarbet, 45 Wash.2d 332, 274 P.2d 341 (1954), Kennedy 
v. Monroe, 165 Kan. 168, 193 P.2d 220, 224 (1948 , Mitchel v. 
Brown, 43 Cal.2d 217, 110 P.2d 456 (1941). 
The pertinent clauses of the deed, the grant and the 
habendum clause,when considered and interpreted together are 
not inconsistent with each other or with Respondents' position. 
. There is reserved into the Grantors three-
fourths (3/4) of all the oil, gas and mineral 
rights to the above land belonging . . . This 
deed is given subject to a prior lease of all 
the oil, gas and mineral rights to said land 
belonging. 
But to interprete the reservation as contended by 
Appellants would be directly contrary to the habendum clause stating 
that the deed is given subject to the prior interest in the 
oil, gas and mineral rights. 
Respondents sub~it that whether the court looks only at 
the language of the deed or also considers proper extrinsic evidence 
from the record the result is the same. The plain meaning of the 
document does not change. The grantors, in conveying to the Appel-
-9-
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lants surface rights to the property, excluded from the convey-
ance and their warranty the previous grant of oil, gas and min-
eral rights by providing that the "deed is given subject to a 
prior lease". The record indicates that the conveyance of 50% 
of the mineral rights to Bennett in 1945 was the only "prior 
lease". In addition to the exclusion from the deed of the prev-
iously conveyed 50%, the grantors also reserved unto themselves 
75% of all the oil, gas and mineral rights belonging to the land. 
While it is possible that the grantors may have mistakenly 
thought they still owned 75% and not 50%, the intent of the lang-
uage is clear: the grantors' deed excluded the oil, gas and min-
eral rights previously conveyed and reserved to the grantors the 
remaining rights, whether it was 75 percent or less than 75 per-
cent. Respondents position is even more clear when considering 
the facts that Hartman had both actual and constructive knowledge 
of the prior conveyance to which the deed was subject and that 
with that knowledge Hartman helped tell the bank what to put in 
the agreement. (R. 215, 227). 
A party who expressly excludes or reserves from a con-
veyance his entire oil, gas and mineral interest, albeit in 
reality he owns less than what he believes, should be deemed to 
have retained that portion which he in fact owns. Any contrary 
result would be patently unreasonable and arbitrary. 
Appellants assert there are three possible interpretatioru 
from the deed and that their interpretation is the only reasonable 
one when the intent of the grantees (Hartmans) is considered. 
Appellants attempt to completely ignore their own knowledge of 
-10-
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the prior 50% conveyance and that the deed was expressly made sub-
ject to that prior interest. With that knowledge Hartmans helped 
the bank draft the deed. 
Appellants claim that the 75% reservation was merely in-
tended by the grantors to reserve the previously conveyed 50% and 
only 25% of the remaining 50%, thereby conveying to Hartmans 25%. 
In reliance on such intention of the parties, Hartmans say they 
s~sequently conveyed the property to Lyard McConkie "reserving 
25% in the grantors". Hartmans do not tell us whether the intent 
of the parties to the subsequent conveyance was the same as the 
intent Appellants claim under the Potter conveyance. Did Hartmans 
in their subsequent conveyance intend to reserve the 25% of the oil, 
gas and mineral rights previously reserved by Potters? If not, did 
Hartmans intend to sell McConkie 75% of the mineral rights which 
they did not own? Did Hartmans intend to breach their Warranty 
of Title? The obvious answers to these questions do not support 
what Hartmans claim the instant parties intended. This court has 
been previously made acquainted with the problems of Appellants 
in drafting and interpreting documents of sale. McConkie v. Hartman, 
529 P.2d 801 (Utah 1974). Unfortunately this court was not then 
aware that Hartmans did not even own what they purported to reserve 
from their conveyance to the McConkies. 
The only basis for support of the position espoused 
by Appellants is by application in this case of the Duhig doctrine 
stated in Duhig v. Peavey-Hoore Lumber Co., 135 Tex. 503, 144 
S.W.2d 878 (1940). However, Appellants have not argued the Dugig 
-11- j 
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doctrine in the lower court or in this court and this court should 
not seek to apply such a doctrine to this case. Furthermore, the 
intent and effect of the recording laws of Utah makes such a doc-
trine inappropriate in Utah. (Sections 57-1-6 and 57-3-2, U.C.A., 
1953 as amended) . Not only were the Hartmans advised by the 
county records that Potters had only 1/2 of the minerals, Hart-
mans admit actual knowledge. Therefore Appellants should have 
known that if Potters were to retain and reserve three-fourths 
of all the minerals belonging to the land, that Appellants would 
receive none. Also, the express language of the conveyance ex-
cludes therefrom the prior conveyance and Potters cannot be 
deemed to have breached any warranty of title under the construc-
tion given the deed by the lower court. Price v. Atlantic Refin-
ing Company, 79 N.M. 629, 447 P.2d 509 (196&) and Mitchel v. 
Brown, supra. 
The lower court properly construed the deed as reserv-
ing in the grantors all of the oil, gas and mineral rights owned 
by the grantors (50%). Appellants should not be heard to exclaim 
that the reservation was intended to reserve the 50% interest 
owned by Bennett when Appellants knew that the grantors did not 
own that 50% and the same 50% was excluded from the deed by the deec 
being made subject to it. 
CONCLUSION 
This court should affirm the Summary Judgment of the 
lower court that title to 50% of the mineral rights is quieted in 
Respondent Potter since the reservation by Potters of 75% acted to 
-12-
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reserve to the grantors the balance of all the oil, gas and 
mineral rights owned by the Potters (50%) and no rights passed 
to Appellants. 
Respectfully Submitted 
Clark R. Nielsen 
NIELSEN, HENRIOD, GOTTFREDSON & PECK 
Attorneys for Respondents Husky and Chevro: 
410 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Served the foregoing by mailing two copies thereof, postage prepaid, to: 
this 
Mr Kenneth M. Hisatake 
1825 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
and 
Robert G. Pruitt, Jr. 
Suite 875 Beneficial Life Tower 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
~day of December, 1978. 
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